Partendo da un corso sul cambiamento politico tenuto da Norberto Bobbio nel 1979 e ora trasformato in un libro postumo grazie ad alcuni studenti di allora, Vitale mette in luce quattro questioni su rivoluzione, riforma e altre forme di cambiamento nell’età moderna e contemporanea. In primo luogo, qual è oggi, nelle nostre società capitalistiche alle prese con i cambiamenti climatici e altri disastri ecologici, il rapporto tra rivoluzioni scientifiche e politiche? In secondo luogo, alla fine del secolo scorso la prospettiva (...) rivoluzionaria è stata abbandonata a favore di un più realistico riformismo, ma possiamo chiederci se questa scelta non abbia portato a un grande inganno, perché il riformismo era in effetti una forma di “dolce” resa alla società di mercato e ai suoi valori. In terzo luogo, ci sono nel nostro tempo gli ingredienti (principalmente, soggetto politico, leadership e un’ideologia ben strutturata) per trasformare la rabbia per l’ingiustizia e la disuguaglianza in un progetto rivoluzionario e non solo in sporadiche rivolte? In quarto luogo, quale ruolo gioca la guerra a livello del cambiamento geopolitico, con particolare riferimento all’attuale guerra in Ucraina che sembra prospettare una nuova situazione di “scontro di civiltà” tra Weltanschauung occidentale e orientale? (shrink)

Este artículo se propone como objetivo analizar detalladamente la definición mínima de democracia propuesta por Norberto Bobbio, sus elementos constitutivos, sus principales características así como sus límites conceptuales, sobre todo sus pretensiones de universalidad, univocidad y neutralidad, enfocándonos críticamente en estos tres últimos elementos en aras de tensionar la definición bobbiana de democracia. Se comenzará por analizar el rasgo procedimental de esta definición. A continuación se descompondrá detalladamente cada uno de los elementos que la caracterizan, haciendo énfasis en el supuesto (...) y prioridad de la libertad. Finalmente, se indicarán una serie de objeciones que obstaculizarían las pretensiones de universalidad, univocidad y neutralidad, tensionando con ello la intencionalidad teórica del filósofo italiano. Metodológicamente hablando, se tratará de un análisis descriptivo y sistemático, no prescriptivo ni tampoco axiológico. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo revelar el contexto de surgimiento y los componen- tes teóricos - metodológicos de un programa de formación doctoral sobre patrimo- nio cultural con enfoque interdisciplinar, elaborado en el marco de un Programade Cooperación Internacional. En lo metodológico, se propició el desarrollo de una metodología cualitativa sin desestimar lo cuantitativo. Los impactos del programa revelan un nivel superior de calidad de los procesos formativos en la Universidad de Oriente, el perfeccionamiento de competencias académicas y científicas al (...) servicio de la sociedad, así como su contribución a las dimensiones curriculares y extracurri- culares del pregrado. (shrink)

El artículo plantea algunas de las relaciones filosóficas entre España y América Latina desde el siglo XVI hasta el siglo XX. Contra la narrativa de la historiografía filosófica corriente, según la cual España no aportó nada a la filosofía moderna, el artículo argumenta que los debates en torno a la humanidad de los indígenas americanos y la guerra justa contribuyeron a expandir la idea de género humano a la vez que se realizaron aportes al derecho internacional; igualmente, que la filosofía (...) política de Francisco Suárez contribuyó a fundamentar la idea de contractualismo y contrato social a la modernidad. Finalmente, se sostiene que vista desde América, La Ilustración española, el krausismo y los aportes de Ortega y Gasset permitieron el ingreso de Nuestra América a la modernidad filosófica europea y su tradición. (shrink)

Although we supposedly live in a representative democracy, citizens in many cases do not really participate in political reality and lack resources in the face of multiple situations in which their rulers do not act in the most appropriate way. The problems are numerous: the attempt of seduction of the citizenship by the political class and its subsequent kidnapping until the following elections for lack of mechanisms of social control, the breach of the electoral programs according to the conveniences; sectarianism, (...) poor political ethics or even clear corruption, use of taxes for unapproved fines, indoctrination, poor separation of powers and real power from political parties... (shrink)

The major social, legal and judicial sensitization on the need to eradicate genderbased violence demands a suitable and effective response from all Public Institutions to safeguard the rights of the women. The principal aim of this article is to highlight the legislative solution given to this problem in relation with immigrant women (third-country nationals). Spanish and EC lawmakers have set out rules relating to gender-based violence for three groups of women: a) Married women or registered partners of European Union, EEE, (...) Swiss or Spanish citizens; b) Women married to third-country nationals; c) Women who are in Spain, married or not, in an irregular situation. The legislation analyzed in this paper regulates only the administrative situation to which women can accede when they are the victims of gender-based violence. That is to say, what types of authorizations can be granted and what possible “benefits” can be obtained, but only in the documentary area. Neither the penal or civil response to gender-based violence is analyzed. (shrink)

Se compara la doctrina de Suárez sobre la causalidad de la voluntad con la de Domingo de Soto. Esto implica compararla también con algunas de las tesis de santo Tomás y de Duns Escoto, pues estos autores medievales son las principales referencias de ambos autores al respecto. Se concluye que Suárez adhiere fundamentalmente a santo Tomás, pero de acuerdo a la interpretación que de él encuentra en Domingo de Soto.

Francisco Suarez published, at Coimbra in 1612, five years before his death, what is undoubtedly one of the greatest contributions to scholastic moral and legal philosophy, his Tractatus de legibus et legislatore Deo. It was part of his commentary on the Prima-Secundae of St. Thomas’s Summa. The complementary study of justice, commenting upon the Secunda-Secundae, never appeared, not even in the posthumous volumes edited by Balthasar Alvarez from the notes and lectures of Suarez. The omission is all the more remarkable (...) when one recalls the innumerable treatises De iustitia et iure that began with Suarez’s own predecessors and contemporaries—Soto, Molina, Lessius and the rest. This omission is now in part repaired by the happy recovery of some Disputationes on justice from Suarez’s sojourn at the Collegium Romanum between 1580 and 1585. They probably belong to the year 1584. The manuscript, a reportatio of whose authenticity there can be no doubt, begins about two-thirds of the way through the second Disputatio and goes on to the end of the fourth. The lost first Disputatio was probably on the object of justice; the second, of which we are now given qq. 11-16, is on ownership; the third, comprising only two questions, is inscribed De actibus iustitiae in genere; and the fourth, of eight questions, De habitu iustitiae. (shrink)

I argue against theories that attempt to reduce scientific representation to similarity or isomorphism. These reductive theories aim to radically naturalize the notion of representation, since they treat scientist's purposes and intentions as non-essential to representation. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that similarity and isomorphism are common but not universal means of representation. I then present four other arguments to show that similarity and isomorphism are not the constituents of scientific representation. I (...) finish by looking at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon the aim to radically naturalize scientific representation are likely to be successful. (shrink)

The Danish scholar Jan Pinborg made outstanding contributions to our understanding of medieval language study. The papers in this volume clearly demonstrate the wealth of Pinborg's scholarly interests and the extent of his influence.Though centered on medieval theories of grammar and language, the collection ranges in time from the fourth century B.C. to the seventeenth century A.D.; theories of the pronoun, of mental language, of supposition, of figurative expressions and of mereology are among the topics discussed; and the papers deal (...) with both humble anonymous teachers of grammar and with such well-known men as Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Peter of Spain, Roger Bacon, Robert Kilwardby, Thomas Aquinas, Dante, William of Ockham, Domingo de Soto, and Suárez. The papers are in English, German, or French. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery ed. by Kevin WhiteIván JaksicKevin White, editor. Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1997. Pp. xv + 326. Cloth, $59.95.The quincentennial of what has been termed the “encounter” between Europeans and Indians in the New World in the late fifteenth century furnished the occasion for much denunciation of the evils inflicted by greedy (...) intruders on the indigenous population and their environment. Many a conference was convened to reflect on such [End Page 463] events from the perspective of what appeared to be a consensus on the ultimately negative effects of European discovery, conquest, and colonization. In this context, it is quite remarkable that a conference on Hispanic philosophy in the age of discovery should have been convened to examine the philosophical figures and treatises of the era. As it turns out, this volume represents probably one of the most enduring outcomes of the myriad activities of 1992. This is a volume that ranges widely into the philosophical world of the period, brings to light the richness and significance of philosophers and their work, and provides a coherent and consistently well-researched set of essays.The volume consists of fifteen essays divided into five parts. Part I consists of one essay by Jorge J. E. Gracia which offers a wide panorama of Hispanic philosophy from 1500 to 1650, as well as a lucid interpretation of the historical reasons why Hispanic philosophy seems to have reached a dead end in the context of modern European philosophy, and suffered the neglect of intervening centuries. Part II consists of one essay by Mauricio Beuchot on discussions concerning the conquest of Mexico; two essays by John Doyle and Marcelo Sánchez-Sorondo on the work of Francisco de Vitoria; and two essays on the celebrated dispute between Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda and Bartolomé de las Casas in 1550–51, the first by Eduardo Andújar and the second by Rafael Alvira and Alfredo Cruz. Part III includes essays by William Wallace on Domingo de Soto and Galileo’s science; Juan Antonio Widow on the economic thought of the Spanish Scholastics; Jean de Groot on the mysticism of Teresa de Avila; Yves Floucat on St. John of the Cross, and Mirko Skarica on the problem of future contingents. Part IV includes three essays by Norman Wells, Stephen Menn, and Carlos G. Noreña on the works of Francisco Suárez, probably the best-known Spanish thinker of the period. The volume closes with Part V, which has a long essay by John Deely on John Poinsot’s doctrine of signs.A volume of this scope and nature is bound to contain some overlap and repetition, as is the case with the pieces concerning the Las Casas-Sepúlveda debate. And yet these essays read well because the authors seriously undermine the conventional treatment of Sepúlveda as the hawkish defender of Indian slavery, and place him in the context of a larger Renaissance view of non-European peoples. Las Casas, in the view of the authors, had a great deal more in common with his opponent than the historiography has thus far suggested. In other sections of the volume, the variety of approaches and subjects on the part of the contributors challenges the reader to constantly shift grounds. Part III, for instance, takes us from the disquisitions on the velocity of falling bodies to the moral aspects of economic thought, and to the meaning of mystical theology. Fortunately, the competence of the researchers makes all individual pieces worthwhile even if this particular reviewer would have been somewhat more stringent with the space allotted to make a point.Contributors to this book leave no doubt as to the importance of their subjects, and yet they resist the temptation of exaggerating the extent of the influence of many of the Spanish authors on other European thinkers. Indeed, the essay by Norman Wells shows that while one must consider the linkages between Suárez and Descartes, there is [End Page 464] no reason to believe that the latter made Suárez’s position on the moderni... (shrink)

Scientific representation is a currently booming topic, both in analytical philosophy and in history and philosophy of science. The analytical inquiry attempts to come to terms with the relation between theory and world; while historians and philosophers of science aim to develop an account of the practice of model building in the sciences. This article provides a review of recent work within both traditions, and ultimately argues for a practice-based account of the means employed by scientists to effectively achieve representation (...) in the modelling sciences. (shrink)

This paper defends the deflationary character of two recent views regarding scientific representation, namely RIG Hughes’ DDI model and the inferential conception. It is first argued that these views’ deflationism is akin to the homonymous position in discussions regarding the nature of truth. There, we are invited to consider the platitudes that the predicate “true” obeys at the level of practice, disregarding any deeper, or more substantive, account of its nature. More generally, for any concept X, a deflationary approach is (...) then defined in opposition to a substantive approach, where a substantive approach to X is an analysis of X in terms of some property P, or relation R, accounting for and explaining the standard use of X. It then becomes possible to characterize a deflationary view of scientific representation in three distinct senses, namely: a “no-theory” view, a “minimalist” view, and a “use-based” view – in line with three standard deflationary responses in the philosophical literature on truth. It is then argued that both the DDI model and the inferential conception may be suitably understood in any of these three different senses. The application of these deflationary ‘hermeneutics’ moreover yields significant improvements on the DDI model, which bring it closer to the inferential conception. It is finally argued that what these approaches have in common – the key to any deflationary account of scientific representation – is the denial that scientific representation may be ultimately reduced to any substantive explanatory property of sources, or targets, or their relations. (shrink)

Holobionts are symbiotic assemblages composed by a host plus its microbiome. The status of holobionts as individuals has recently been a subject of continuous controversy, which has given rise to two main positions: on the one hand, holobiont advocates argue that holobionts are biological individuals; on the other, holobiont detractors argue that they are just mere chimeras or ecological communities, but not individuals. Both parties in the dispute develop their arguments from the framework of the philosophy of biology, in terms (...) of what it takes for a “conglomerate” to be considered an interesting individual from a biological point of view. However, the debates about holobiont individuality have important ontological implications that have remained vaguely explored from a metaphysical framework. The purpose of this paper is to cover that gap by presenting a metaphysical approach to holobionts individuality. Drawing upon a conception of natural selection that puts the focus on the transgenerational recurrence of the traits and that supports the thesis that holobionts are units of selection, we argue that holobionts bear emergent traits and exert downward powers over the entities that compose them. In this vein, we argue, a reasonable argument can be made for conceiving holobionts as emergent biological individuals. (shrink)

Symbiosis plays a fundamental role in contemporary biology, as well as in recent thinking in philosophy of biology. The discovery of the importance and universality of symbiotic associations has brought new light to old debates in the field, including issues about the concept of biological individuality. An important aspect of these debates has been the formulation of the hologenome concept of evolution, the notion that holobionts are units of natural selection in evolution. This review examines the philosophical assumptions that underlie (...) recent proposal of the hologenome concept of evolution, and traces those debates back in time to their historical origins, to the moment when the connection between the topics of symbiosis and biological individuality first caught the attention of biologists. The review is divided in two parts. The first part explores the historical origins of the connection between the notion of symbiosis and the concept of biological individuality, and emphasizes the role of A. de Bary, R. Pound, A. Schneider and C. Merezhkowsky in framing the debate. The second part examines the hologenome concept of evolution and explores four parallelisms between contemporary debates and the debates presented in the first part of the essay, arguing that the different debates raised by the hologenome concept were already present in the literature. I suggest that the novelty of the hologenome concept of evolution lies in the wider appreciation of the importance of symbiosis for maintaining life on Earth as we know it. Finally, I conclude by suggesting the importance of exploring the connections among contemporary biology, philosophy of biology and history of biology in order to gain a better understanding of contemporary biology. (shrink)

This paper argues for a broadly dispositionalist approach to the ontology of Bohmian mechanics . It first distinguishes the ‘minimal’ and the ‘causal’ versions of Bohm’s theory, and then briefly reviews some of the claims advanced on behalf of the ‘causal’ version by its proponents. A number of ontological or interpretive accounts of the wave function in BM are then addressed in detail, including configuration space, multi-field, nomological, and dispositional approaches. The main objection to each account is reviewed, namely the (...) ‘problem of perception’, the ‘problem of communication’, the ‘problem of temporal laws’, and the ‘problem of under-determination’. It is then shown that a version of dispositionalism overcomes the under-determination problem while providing neat solutions to the other three problems. A pragmatic argument is thus furnished for the use of dispositions in the interpretation of the theory more generally. The paper ends in a more speculative note by suggesting ways in which a dispositionalist interpretation of the wave function is in addition able to shed light upon some of the claims of the proponents of the causal version of BM. (shrink)

I argue against an account of scientific representation suggested by the semantic, or structuralist, conception of scientific theories. Proponents of this conception often employ the term “model” to refer to bare “structures”, which naturally leads them to attempt to characterize the relation between models and reality as a purely structural one. I argue instead that scientific models are typically “representations”, in the pragmatist sense of the term: they are inherently intended for specific phenomena. Therefore in general scientific models are not (...) (merely) structures. I then explore some consequences of this pragmatist account of representation, and argue that it sheds light upon the distinction between theories and models. I finish by briefly addressing some critical comments due to Bas Van Fraassen. (shrink)

This Element has two main aims. The first one is an historically informed review of the philosophy of probability. It describes recent historiography, lays out the distinction between subjective and objective notions, and concludes by applying the historical lessons to the main interpretations of probability. The second aim focuses entirely on objective probability, and advances a number of novel theses regarding its role in scientific practice. A distinction is drawn between traditional attempts to interpret chance, and a novel methodological study (...) of its application. A radical form of pluralism is then introduced, advocating a tripartite distinction between propensities, probabilities and frequencies. Finally, a distinction is drawn between two different applications of chance in statistical modelling which, it is argued, vindicates the overall methodological approach. The ensuing conception of objective probability in practice is the 'complex nexus of chance'. (shrink)

This article defends a selective eliminativist position with respect to the concept of “biological lineage” as used in certain areas of contemporary evolutionary biology. We argue that its primary epistemic roles in these contexts—explaining social evolution and cumulative selection—clash with empirical evidence, and that enforcing the concept of “lineage” even obstructs fruitful research avenues in several biological research fields, including phylogenetic research. Drawing on this, we suggest that, in many instances, it would be best to get rid of the concept (...) of “lineage” and think in terms that are more closely aligned with the empirical complexity of the biological world. Specifically, this entails that, instead of looking for the lineage that may have given rise to the entities possessing certain biological characteristics, biologists should generally look for any potential process allowing such possession, with the formation of a lineage just one possibility among many. (shrink)

The use of molecules and reactions as evidence, markers and/or traits for evolutionary processes has a history more than a century long. Molecules have been used in studies of intra-specific variation and studies of similarity among species that do not necessarily result in the analysis of phylogenetic relations. Promoters of the use of molecular data have sustained the need for quantification as the main argument to make use of them. Moreover, quantification has allowed intensive statistical analysis, as a condition and (...) a product of increasing automation. All of these analyses are subject to the methodological anxiety characteristic of a community in search of objectivity. It is in this context that scientists compared and evaluated protein and nucleic acid sequence data with other types of molecular data – including immunological, electrophoretic and hybridization data. This paper argues that by looking at long-term historical processes, such as the use of molecular evidence in evolutionary biology, we gain valuable insights into the history of science. In that sense, it accompanies a growing concern among historians for big-pictures of science that incorporate the fruitful historical research on local cases of the last decades. (shrink)

These are the introduction chapters to the forthcoming collection of essays published by Springer (Synthese Library) and entitled Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in Physics.

This paper presents an account of the nature of stem cells based on the philosophical concept of disposition. It is argued that stem cells can be conceived as dispositional objects, and adopting this attitude allows overcoming some of the controversies surrounding the nature of stemness (most notably, the state vs. entity debate) because it offers a framework that accommodates the lessons from different theories. Additionally, the account is simultaneously useful for interpreting stem cell experiments and guiding potential interventions. The account (...) shows how different levels, both molecular and emergent network-level, play the primary causal role in explaining some empirical results, and hence they suggest that the explanations can be mechanistic or topological, respectively. The realization that any of these levels may play a more prominent causal role than another allows suggesting interventions at the genetic, molecular and population levels. (shrink)

I argue against an account of scientific representation suggested by the semantic, or structuralist, conception of scientific theories. Proponents of this conception often employ the term “model” to refer to bare “structures”, which naturally leads them to attempt to characterize the relation between models and reality as a purely structural one. I argue instead that scientific models are typically “representations”, in the pragmatist sense of the term: they are inherently intended for specific phenomena. Therefore in general scientific models are not (...) (merely) structures. I then explore some consequences of this pragmatist account of representation, and argue that it sheds light upon the distinction between theories and models. I finish by briefly addressing some critical comments due to Bas Van Fraassen. (shrink)

In this special issue we explore practices of scientific inquiry into human populations in Latin America in order to generate new insights into the complex historical and sociopolitical dynamics that have made certain human groups integral to the production of scientific knowledge in and about the region. In important contributions, other scholars have shown that the science of human difference is racist and all too often has been a mediator of development ideologies. To further unpack these arguments we focus attention (...) on the complex interaction between scientists and the populations they study. We explore cases from across the fields of evolutionary biology, demography, epidemiology... (shrink)

I argue that the Causal Markov Condition (CMC) is in principle applicable to the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) correlations. This is in line with my defence in the past of the applicability of the Principle of Common Cause to quantum mechanics. I first review a contrary claim by Dan Hausman and Jim Woodward, who endeavour to preserve the CMC against a possible counterexample by asserting that the conditions for the application of the CMC are not met in the EPR experiment. In their (...) view the CMC is inapplicable to the EPR correlations—i.e. it neither obtains nor fails. The view is grounded upon the non-separability of the quantum state, and the consequent unavailability of interventions. I urge that whether interventions are available in EPR—and why—is a complex and contextual question that does not have a unique or uniform answer. Instead, I argue that different combinations of causal hypotheses under test and interpretations of quantum mechanics yield different answers to the question. (shrink)

In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation (and scientific representation in particular) is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show thatthis pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth.

One of the most controversial and currently developed lines of research in philosophy of biology is that in which philosophers investigate pre-Darwinian assumptions that would still be present at the base of other philosophical sub-disciplines, such as ethics, epistemology, philosophy of language, etc. This type of inquiry, which I will call here “meta-philosophical interrogation,” can be thought as a complementary approach to the epistemological one, which allows us to broaden the critical approach of the discipline in question. The objective of (...) this article will be to analyze the characteristics of the “meta-philosophical interrogation” and to argue about its legitimacy as a way of inquiry proper to the philosophy of biology. (shrink)

I defend a three-fold form of pluralism about chance, involving a tripartite distinction between propensities, probabilities, and frequencies. The argument has a negative and a positive part. Negatively, I argue against the identity thesis that informs current propensity theories, which already suggests the need for a tripartite distinction. Positively, I argue that that a tripartite distinction is implicit in much statistical practice. Finally, I apply a well-known framework in the modelling literature in order to characterize these three separate concepts functionally (...) in terms of their roles in modelling practice. (shrink)

This is an introductory essay to the symposium on Michael Friedman’s The Dynamics of Reason. It provides a summary description of the symposium and its rationale; an introduction to Michael Friedman’s views on the a priori and what it refers to as ‘developmental Kantianism’; a summary of the content of each of the four contributed papers in the symposium; and a philosophical analysis of the symposium as a whole in relation with developmental Kantianism.

This paper is divided in two parts. In part I, I argue against two attempts to naturalise the notion of scientific representation, by reducing it to isomorphism and similarity. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that isomorphism and similarity are common means of representation; but that they are not constituents of scientific representation. I look at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon the aim (...) to naturalise scientific representation are likely to be successful. In part II of the paper, I present a deflationary conception of scientific representation, which minimally characterises it by means of two necessary conditions: representation is essentially intentional and it has the capacity to allow surrogate reasoning and inference. I then defend this conception by showing that it successfully meets the objections and difficulties that make its competitors, such as isomorphism and similarity, untenable. In addition the inferential conception explains the success of various means of representation in their appropriate domains, and it sheds light on the truth and accuracy of scientific representations. (shrink)

An analysis of the evolution of the overlapping histories of human rights and development, and an exploration of the alternatives, through the lens of indigenous and other southern theories and epistemologies.

Essay Review of Tim Maudlin's "The Metaphysics within Physics", Oxford University Press, 2007.

En el presente texto abordamos a la luz de la antropología filosófica la pregunta por nuestra experiencia de la enfermedad. Como seres dotados de palabra, esta experiencia está mediada siempre por nuestra manera de hablar sobre ella. El poder nombrar lo que nos pasa nos configura como individuos orgánicos peculiares, frente a otras formas de vida. Pero al hablar sobre nuestras enfermedades caemos en una profunda paradoja: tenemos la necesidad de comunicar a otros nuestra vivencia, que es algo tan íntimo (...) y privado que individualiza; de otra parte, la comprensión de los otros de lo que nos pasa encuentra, sin embargo, un límite casi infranqueable. A menudo, este límite suele ser bordeado por la metáfora y su lenguaje traslaticio. Queremos examinar, a continuación, la relación que podemos establecer entre enfermedad, dolor y metáfora. (shrink)

One of the central limitations of sensory substitution devices (SSDs) is their inability to reproduce the non-sensory feelings that are normally associated with visual experiences, especially hedonic and aesthetic responses. This limitation is sometimes reported to cause SSD users frustration. To make matters worse, it is unclear that improvements in acuity, bandwidth, or training will resolve the issue. Yet, if SSDs are to actually reproduce visual experience in its fullness, it seems that the reproduction of non-sensory feelings will be of (...) some importance. We offer a novel solution. Researchers can produce hedonic and aesthetic responses by eliciting these feelings artificially, pairing distal objects that should be pleasurable to pleasurable stimulus outputs from the SSD. We outline two strategies for accomplishing this: first, by means of a prefixed, hardwired, association of pleasant distal objects to pleasant stimulus outputs from the SSD; second, by means of a flexible, feedback-based association which creates associations based on a subject-directed matching of distal objects to patterns of stimuli from the SSD which the subject takes to have the corresponding hedonic properties. We evaluate some problems with both strategies, and we argue that the feedback-based strategy is more promising. Researchers can use this strategy to help the blind, allowing them to take pleasure in the objects they perceive using SSDs. (shrink)

This paper critically reviews Philip Kitcher's most recent epistemology of science, real realism . I argue that this view is unstable under different understandings of the term 'representation', and that the arguments offered for the position are either unsound or invalid depending on the understanding employed. Suitably modified those arguments are however convincing in favor of a deflationary version of real realism, which I refer to as the bare view . The bare view accepts Kitcher's Galilean strategy, and the ensuing (...) commitment to the existence of unobservables; but it does not trade on a correspondence or copy theory of representation. So the bare view, unlike real realism, does not entail that our representations match reality even approximately. (shrink)